COMMENTARY
IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?
THE BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY:
WE'RE OKAY, YOU'RE NOT
Political conservatives contend that
much of government consists of selfserving attempts by interested parties to
use the power of the state for group aggrandizement. They will find aid and
comfort for their weltanschauung in the
operations of the state Board of Psychology. Not that anyone need look far for
demonstrations of cartels masquerading
successfully as public officialdom-but
this Board may be an illustrative archetype. The word "quintessential" captures
the spirit.

Only Bob Newharts Need Apply:
The Problem of
Testing Competence
The first problem faced by a board
attempting to regulate professional psychologists through licensure is concededly difficult: How does it determine
who should be licensed? As with most
agencies regulating a trade or profession, the Psychology Board is given the
power to license in order to assure honest and competent practitioners. But how
does one assure a competent psychologist? Do you test for it? How? Do you
require an apprenticeship? What are the
criteria? What is a correct answer? Are
you sure?
The Psychology Board has taken the
traditional approach-educational requirements, supervised experience, a nationally standardized written test used
in all fifty states, and an oral examination. However, the examinations do not
assure competence. They are more a measure of a student's familiarity with vocabulary and general doctrine. To be fair,
such a criticism can be made of many
trades and professions licensed through
examination. Even the licensure examinations administered to physicians or attorneys have little to do with the actual
skills relied upon by clients or patients.
Rather, they are a kind of general intelligence test measuring the ability of the
student to retain material recently absorbed over the past several months or
years. The Board of Psychology, as with
most regulatory agencies, does not at-

tempt to measure competence-even
minimally-in the areas of actual practice as practitioners specialize, nor does
it require retesting over the forty- or fiftyyear span of a career. In other words, the
purported rationale for the entry barrier
in many cases is only loosely related to
its actual function. In a very indirect
sense, a person able to pass the test must
have general skills of retention, reasoning, and writing which probably relate to
indices of competence. However, it 1s
gilding the lily to think that there is a
bona fide effort to assure actual competence-something probably more effectively accomplished not by one "you're
in the club" general intelligence dayslong test barrier, but by a short two-hour
examination every three years in the particular specialty and practice of the professional as relied upon by the public.
Be that as it may, the Psychology
Board is no more cartel structured than
are most similar agencies. However, its
examination-given the nebulous and
sometimes disputed nature of the services provided-is particularly imprecise as an indicator of competence. Moreover, the Board's cartel cup runneth over
as it confronts applications from licensed
psychologists of other states moving to
California. Here is an interesting test of
the bona fides of a regulatory scheme.
The Board of Psychology does not pass
this examination.

Circle the WagonsHere Come the Infidels
Unlike attorney practice (which turns
on knowledge of a state's common law
and procedures), psychology is not statespecific (aside from basic knowledge of
California law or public policy pertaining to psychology). Although some commentators contend otherwise, there is no
unique California "psyche" requiring
separate training. Under these circumstances, how should a regulatory agency
set up reciprocity with other states? Automatic reciprocity with all states could
be suggested, but there is concededly a
legitimate interest in each state assuring
the protection of its citizens from dishonest and incompetent practice-perhaps under standards higher than those
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selected by other sovereign jurisdictions.
Okay. But on the other extreme, why
would an agency wish to bar a demonstrably competent practitioner from another jurisdiction? Where such a practitioner applies, look what the agency has
to work with. It has an applicant who has
not only taken a likely similar examination, but one who has practiced for some
time and may have a track record to
examine.
The legislature was aware of the appropriateness of reciprocity when it enacted section 2946 of the Business and
Professions Code, creating a second track
(actually three additional tracks) for the
licensure of out-of-state psychologists. 1
The Board is commanded to consider
Iicensure without examination based on
the performance of an applicant already
licensed in another jurisdiction. The law
specifically permits the Board to waive
the exam for psychologists "who have
made a significant contribution to psychology and have had at least 10 years
of experience." This should be a ready
avenue for licensure. Here you have an
academic record, the examination passed,
and the experience and professional
record to review. Where such a practitioner is able to approach the midrange
of current practitioners now being
licensed, one would think that approval
should be forthcoming. After all, here
you are not rolling dice while
blindfolded.
Certainly these out-of-state practitioners could be required to take the entry
examination. "They should take the exam
like we did." "Why not take the examination? It should be no problem for them
if they should be licensed." But such
sentiments are disingenuous. As we have
noted, the entry examination does not
directly relate to competence in actual
practice, particularly for practitioners
who have specialized in particular areas
of practice and are developed in their
careers. How easily would an advanced
neurosurgeon pass the standard national
board exam? Would a renowned criminal defense attorney, patent expert, or
immigration specialist automatically pass
the multistate portion of the Bar examination, or the general essay qu_estions
concerning areas of the law far removed
from and irrelevant to their practices? 2
The point is that the out-of-state senior practitioner should not be subject to
the same examination imposed on entry;
it does not test actual competence except
in an indirect sense not relevant to advanced and usually specialized skills.
When applied to advanced practitioners,
it becomes a cynical device to keep the
infidels out-not because they are incompetent, but because they are

1r
competitors. "A harsh judgment," you
observe. "Prove it!" you rightfully demand. Enter Dr. Frank McGuigan, Exhibit A.

McGuigan v. Board of Psychology:
The Cartel Is Tested
Let's see, how would we fashion a
resume to test our thesis? Let's give him
a bachelor's and master's degree from
UCLA, a California institution of some
competence. Let's give him a doctorate
from the University of Southern California. Then let's give him a distinguished
42-year career, including both extensive
clinical practice and academia. Let's
make him a teacher of psychology, one
who has trained California students to
practice psychology for the past nine
years. A professor of psychology and
director of a research institute. Let's license him in two states. Let's make him
the author of some one hundred articles
in the major journals of psychology scholarship. Have him write not one or five
but more than twenty books in the field
of psychology, including a text on experimental psychology which has been
translated into six foreign editions and is
among the most used in colleges throughout the world today. Give him international awards. Make him a diplomate in
expert professional societies for which
the psychologists who sit on the Psychology Board are not qualified and only
dream about. 3 List him in 22 directories
as a noted practitioner and scholar.
Now you have our hypothetical test.
Except we did not make him up as
Stanford students have done for years in
attempting to graduate dogs and fictional
persons from their institution. Frank
McGuigan is not a "Warren G. Wonka."
Frank exists, and he asked the Board for
reciprocity licensure under section 2946.
What do you think happened? Perhaps, you might muse, there was a threesecond discussion at a Board meeting
during which the members expressed
pleasure that such a prominent practitioner would want to join their club and
scoffed at the notion that such a person
would not meet the minimal standards
for practice in California. Perhaps you
opine that such a decision would be, in
the current vernacular, a "no-brainer." If
so, you do not fully appreciate the cartel
"circle the wagons" mentality of a group
of peers in full regalia as "keepers of the
faith" and "defenders of the flame." You
do not understand the dynamic that controls the Board of Psychology~onsisting in majority of practicing psychologists who lack Frank's qualifications and
largely engage in a competing theory of
analysis and treatment. They said no to
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Dr. McGuigan. No waiver, and no license without taking that exam.
Dr. McGuigan could have studied a
great deal of material irrelevant to his
current practice, and taken the examination. But he was understandably insulted,
and rightfully curious why section 2946
of the Business and Professions Code
exists and who, if not he, would qualify
under it. He inquired of the Center for
Public Interest Law about his remedies.
We informed him that under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), he had a
right to a "statement of issues" detailing
where and how his application failed to
meet the relevant standards, and to a
hearing if he believed the statement of
issues was in error. We agreed to make
sure Dr. McGuigan got a hearing, because we believed that this oversight
would be redressed. No, we are not naive, but we believed that-at least at the
extremes~artel tribalism would give
way at least to basic constitutional requirement. We felt that in the course of a
hearing, the Board would change its
mind-with profuse and appropriate
apology in hand. And, if the Board did
not do so, we were certain that an administrative law judge would do so, and that
a court would certainly look askance at
any effort to violate legislative intent.
We were wrong on all three counts.
Let us briefly describe Frank
McGuigan's six-year odyssey. He initially asked the Board for reciprocity
Iicensure in 1984. The Board denied his
request repeatedly over a four-year period. with shifting "justifications" in each
denial. We learned early on that the Board
had adopted no rules, criteria, or standards to guide exam waiver approvals
for out-of-state licensees. It wasn't interested in standards to which it might be
held, but preferred ad hoc individual decisions--one at a time-without reference to each other or to any consistent
policy. Except there was one theme permeating these individual decisions: the
Board said no.
Upon our advice, Dr. McGuigan requested the statement of issues and hearing to which he is mandatorily entitled in
1988; this prompted a denial, Frank's
request for reconsideration, and another
denial. We agreed to represent Frank in
1990, and reiterated his demand for an
AP A statement of issues and hearing.
That request was denied in March 1990.
We were forced to file suit to compel
the Board to afford this individual his
basic rights to procedural fairness. As
we approached the court date for the
hearing on his demand, the Board suddenly conceded. Okay, Dr. McGuigan
would get his hearing, but only Dr.
McGuigan. The Board reiterated its po-

sition that a hearing on a denial of an
exam waiver is not required, and announced its intent to deny such hearing
to anyone and everyone else. We discuss
the problem of obtaining such elementary due process in our second commentary below.

The Office of Administrative
Hearings in Supine Repose
Eventually, the good doctor got his
hearing, presided over by Chief Administrative Law Judge Karl Engeman. The
result? The Board was sustained in its
denial. The administrative law judge, to
his credit, fairly stated the record and the
qualifications of Dr. McGuigan; it was
an impressive recitation and appeared to
lead to an obvious conclusion to license.
So how did the decision make a non
sequitur leap from prolific praise to
affirmation of the agency decision not to
license? Factually, the only ephemera
cited by the ALJ was the fact that although Dr. McGuigan had impeccable
qualifications as a scholar, theoretician,
writer, and teacher, it was not entirely
clear that he has the practical skills necessary for effective clinical practice.
Wait a minute. If one is qualified to
write the book and to teach current practitioners, how does it follow that he is
unable to practice himself? To be sure,
there are teachers of medicine who cannot perform surgery because they lack
the tactile skill to tie surgical knots within
the proverbial matchbox. But with all
due respect to Judge Engeman, the clinical skills of a psychologist are not physical, but involve the ability to listen and
communicate effectively. To know what
to say and do and why and how. These
are hardly different skills than those involved in teaching, particularly when one
is teaching others what to say and do and
why and how. In this profession at least,
the ability to teach others to do it is rather
a strong indication that the teacher can
do it.
Further, Judge Engeman accepted an
unlawful "underground rule" standard
proffered by the witness for the Board at
the hearing. The Board's witness testified that the Board interprets the phrase
"significant contribution to psychology,''
as that term is used in Business and Professions Code section 2946, to mean that
"the applicant has contributed one or
more works widely recognized and accepted by a broad range of psychologists
and that books reflecting that work would
ordinarily be found on the reference shelf
of most practicing psychologists." The
Board has never adopted this criterion
under the Administrative Procedure Act,
and the fairness of (mis)applying it to an
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applicant who has no knowledge of it is
dubious at best. In any event, the AU
has no business accepting this so-called
"standard" from the mouth of a Board
witness; next time around, regarding another applicant, in front of a different
AU, a different "standard" may emerge.
The real explanation for the Engeman
decision may be found in his referral to
the legal standard, i.e., he was unable to
find that the Board "abused its discretion." "While the Board could take what
might be characterized as a more generous interpretation of this basis for exam
waiver. the statute vests in them the sole
discretion to grant any waivers of the
examination," wrote Judge Engeman.
The AU openly deferred to the judgment of the agency-even under what he
acknowledged to be in extremis facts. 4
One purpose behind an independent
Office of Administrative Hearings is just
that: its independence. Scholars have long
complained about jurisdictions which
place their administrative law judges as
employees of the very agencies whose
prosecutions they adjudicate. It does little
good to have independent review and
factfinding followed by application of
legal standards when they are applied in
such a servile fashion.

Conclusion: The Cartel
Gets Shelter
The Board of Psychology's judgment
that "we're okay, you're not" covers anyone not already in the club. It is interesting that, as with the other medical profession regulators, entry barriers are assiduously applied-while, at the same
time, practitioners who demonstrate incompetence after they are licensed are
seldom removed or sanctioned. 5 Those
who are in the circle are protected. Outsiders are from a dangerous and alien
"tribe."
What has puzzled Dr. McGuigan angers us. We understand the need to erect
barriers to entry in extraordinary circumstances-to bar from practice a person
whose incompetence can create irreparable harm. But does a psychology examination do that? Even if it afforded
such an assurance, is it an indication
entitled to greater weight than forty years
of brilliant performance? Why have not
all of the out-of-state applicants since
1990 (six at last count) been welcomed
with gratitude, rather than rejected? Most
appear to have credentials easily warranting licensure. Is this Board protecting us?
And we are more disappointed with
the Office of Administrative Hearings.
California has removed this office from
agency control and given it independence ·

so its administrative law judges may serve
as a separate check on agency abuse of
discretion. What is the message when
the director of the entire Office delivers
what amounts to an adjudicative blank
check to the agency?

FOOTNOTES
I. Section 2946 requires the Board
of Psychology to grant a license without
examination "to any person who, at the
time of application is licensed or certified by a psychology licensing authority
in another state if the requirements for
obtaining a certificate or license in that
state were substantially equivalent to the
requirements of this chapter."
In addition, section 2946 authorizes
the Board to "waive those parts of the
examination, including either the whole
of the written or the oral examinations,
when in the judgment of the board the
applicant has already demonstrated competence in areas covered by those parts
of the examination," and to waive the
exam in its entirety to "diplomates of the
American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology or psychologists who
have made a significant contribution to
psychology and have had at least 10 years
of experience."
2. The most extreme example of the
irrelevance of such an initial barrier is
probably the real estate broker's examination. Here you have an interesting multiple-choice question pattern: Each year
a percentage of the questions answered
correctly is eliminated. We all know
about the ambiguities often prevalent in
multiple- choice questions-and one can
imagine the natural selection monster
several years of such elimination would
create. But there is salvation, because the
exam review courses pay examinees to
memorize questions and the "schools"
then give their students books with the
questions and answers from prior exams-including many questions which
will reappear. Pay us, memorize thesea true test of competence.
3. Dr. McGuigan is a Fellow of the
American Psychological Association, the
premier psychological association in the
United States. Fellows are selected in
recognition of outstanding and unusual
contributions to the science and profession of psychology. While Dr.
McGuigan is a Fellow of the Association, the psychologist members of the
Board of Psychology are mere members
of the Association.
4. The same spirit of deference also
guided the ALJ's decision that a second
basis for Dr. McGuigan 's Ii censure would
not apply. Business and Professions Code
section 2946 requires the Board to waive
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the California examination where the
applicant has taken an equivalent examination elsewhere. Here is one of the reasons cited by the ALJ in upholding the
Board's denial of licensure on this alternate basis: "First, it may be reasonaqly
inferred that the oral component of the
Virginia exam did not cover laws peculiar to the practice of psychology in California in 1984." The question raised by
this analysis is: When will any examination ever qualify as equivalent if it must
include California-specific questions?
The legislature's statutes supersede the
Board and the ALJ is charged with interpreting them. Why would the legislature
allow for examination reciprocity by specific command if it could never occur?
Again, the criterion here used by the AU
acquiesces abjectly to the agency. The
judge applied a rule neither adopted nor
lawfully adoptable, and precludes application of California law while upholding
a tabula rasa delegation of authority to
the Board to deny reciprocity to any and
to all applicants.
5. See Fellmeth, Physician Discipline
in California: A Code Blue Emergency,
9:2 Cal. Reg. L. Rep. (Spring 1989) at I.
Most of the criticisms directed at the
Medical Board of California apply as
well to the Board of Psychology, which
operates as one of the allied health licensing programs under the Medical
Board's general aegis (albeit with substantial independence). The pathetic data
concerning physician disciplinary sanctions generally hold true for most of the
allied health professions, including licensed psychologists. As with physician
discipline, the agency is essentially moribund in removing incompetent practitioners from practice. In the 1989-90 annual report of the Department of Consumer Affairs (the most recent statistics
available), the Board of Psychology reports that, out of 15,225 licensees and
442 consumer complaints, it revoked four
licenses and suspended three others.

JUDICIAL CHECK OF
AGENCY ABUSE:
THE THIRD DISTRICT
MOOTS ITSELF
As our comment above recounts, Dr.
Frank McGuigan was rejected for reciprocity licensure as a psychologist in
California notwithstanding an impressive
record: degrees from UCLA and USC;
42 years as practitioner, professor,
scholar; and Fellow status in the American Psychological Association. As we
argue above, one would think that a person who has written one hundred major
articles and twenty books, including a
3
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leading text used in the world on experimental psychology, might be viewed as
meeting minimum standards to practice. A big Steve Martin "but
nooooooooooh" to that. And a no to all
others so applying from out-of-state.
We have noted our disappointment with
the Office of Administrative Hearings
in its obsequious deference to whatever
the agency decides. Dr. McGuigan decided not to test the agency's refusal to
license him in court; such a contest
would have consumed substantial resources. But he did challenge the
agency's failure to give him a hearing.
In this regard, Frank sought to preserve
his right to procedural due processour most basic check on bureaucratic
abuse.
On behalf of Dr. McGuigan, the Center for Public Interest Law sued the
Board of Psychology to compel it to
give him an explanation and hearing on
its refusal to license him without examination under Business and Professions Code section 2946. As noted
above, if a person believes that he has
been wrongly denied licensure to practice his trade or profession, he has a
right to an explanation of his deficiencies (a "statement of issues"), and-if
he believes that this explanation is erroneous or improper-to a hearing. 1 This
assurance is constitutionally based, is
included explicitly in the Administrative Procedure Act fully applicable to
the Board of Psychology,2 and is even
restated in the adopted rules of the
agency. 3 Nevertheless, this agency said
"no" to both, and reiterated that position over a period of two years of travail
as Frank and CPIL attempted to persuade it otherwise.

The Conflicted Role of the
Attorney General
It is unclear to us at the outset how
the Attorney General can represent a
bureaucracy which seeks to violate the
law. The Attorney General is in a conflicted position as counsel for the agency
while also serving as the chief law enforcement officer of the state. We believe that the Rules of Professional Conduct compel withdrawal as counsel of
any attorney being asked to facilitate a
continuing violation of law; for the Attorney General to remain as counsel
under such circumstances appears to us
to be a breach of the canons of ethics.
We filed suit in Sacramento County
Superior Court to obtain the statement
of issues and hearing to which Dr.
McGuigan was entitled. As noted above,
when the hearing date approached, the
Deputy Attorney General representing
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the Board announced that Dr. McGuigan
would be given an explanation and hearing, but that no other applicant would
be so treated. She then stood before the
superior court and asked for dismissal,
contending the matter was moot. The
court so dismissed.
Did you get all that? The Board denied Frank's request for a waiver for
four years. It then denied his request for
a hearing for two more years. The minute
he found an attorney willing and able to
file suit on his behalf, the Board-presumably upon the advice of its attorney,
the chief law enforcement officer of the
state-immediately granted the hearing.
That same attorney was then able to
convince the court-with its overloaded
docket-not to rule on the legal issue
presented, thus enabling the Board to
continue unabated its arbitrary, standard less decisionmaking and its wholesale disregard for the due process rights
of applicants.
A brilliant move-simply run every
applicant around the barn, force them to
exhaust resources on an attorney, and
then give them their rightful due only if
they pay the high entry fee. All others
are denied. Constitutional rights-if you
can afford to wait six years and spend
your personal treasury. This from the
Attorney General-the chief law enforcement officer of the state.
But wait. There is a doctrine in
law developed just to prevent such
chicanery.

The Protector of Agency AbuseExceptions to the
Mootness Doctrine
Even if a defendant decides to placate a particular plaintiff, an exception
to the "mootness" doctrine requires the
court to decide the merits of a case
where the challenged action is likely to
recur or it is in the public interest to do
so. Thus, we decided to take the issue of
Dr. McGuigan's right to a hearing-an
issue not formally decided when the
Board decided to grant a hearing "in this
one case"-to the Third District Court
of Appeal. The appeal was an important
one and in defense of a basic principle.
Here, in an extreme case, an agency had
denied basic rights guaranteed by a long
line of constitutional cases, by statutory
command, and by its own rules. It had
publicly contended that it intended to
commit such breaches again. At best,
only those able to afford writ actions
would be afforded their rights. Further
(and as the Board well knew), without a
ruling on the merits, Dr. McGuigan could
never recover his attorneys' fees; he
would never be made whole.

For these reasons, a long line of
cases-without compromise or equivocation-have held that where such violations are likely to recur, the court
should enter judgment instructing the
agency on the proper law and allowin~
the plaintiff the right to be made whole.
Such a policy is not merely just; it is a
practical necessity if the courts are to
fulfill their most important functionacting as a check on the other two
branches. Where the institution sought
to be balanced has very little in the way
of politically-based checks, such a role
demand is especially enhanced. The
Board is not amenable to electorate response. It is special-funded and is not
under general fund budget scrutiny. Yet
it has important judicial, executive, and
legislative powers-held in concert.
In order for the courts to perform
their important role in balancing and
checking the agencies, they must receive cases. They are passive. They do
not bring actions. To receive cases, they
must be sensitive to the mechanisms
which bring controversies into their domain. The mootness exception is one
of the most important of those mechanisms. If our judiciary allows agency
defendants to pick off from court judgment each plaintiff able to afford to run
the legal gauntlet, the courts self-abdicate. The courts are then saying, "We
leave it to you defendants to decide
what we hear and cede to you the power
to reserve the application of our constitutional guarantees and statutory protections to those able to reach us case
by case, person by person. There will
be no stare decisis effect, no collateral
estoppel, no attorney fee equity
redress."

The Court Moots Itself
into Impotence
Would a court deny its own essential
role and suffer its own abdication? Yes,
it would and it did. It implied full recognition that the agency was wrong, but
opined that the issue was moot. While
the issue will recur, it will do so in the
context where the individual so abused
can seek his or her own redress by court
suit, as did Dr. McGuigan, and obtain
the rights abridged. In a spate of pathetic linguistic legerdemain, Presiding
Justice Puglia managed to state the very
reason for the exception, as ensconced
in over a dozen published opinions, as
the justification for not applying it. 5 The
Board of Psychology made a laughingstock of the Court of Appeal, and Justice Puglia-along with Justices Marler
and Davis-joined in the laughter.
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The opinion, which was mercifully
designated as unpublished, 6 is not
nearly as interesting as is figuring out
why it was written. To some extent,
the oral argument in the case is worth
discussing, because it reveals symptoms
of a larger problem-larger certainly
than the cartel pattern of the Board of
Psychology.

Our Amateur Psychoanalysis:
Why the Courts Abdicate
The Critical Legal Studies movement
centered at Harvard contends that most
judicial opinions are result-oriented. Further, scholars of this school contend
that personal ideology is one of the leading explanatory variables. I agree that
most (not all) judicial opinions are result-oriented; however, I believe the
CLS explanation misses the mark.
It is not ideology or even class which
determines the result. It is something
much more interesting. Our society has
divided into tribes as never before. Instead of the overarching national tribes
or the intimate family tribes, we now
find succor in occupational tribes. Every trade and profession is politically
represented as never before in our history. We identify with our professional
peers, those who have endured similar
boot camp entry experiences and share
similar occupational problems. Weidentify horizontally, not vertically. We associate more with other hospital administrators, attorneys, merchants, not with
our patients, clients, and customers. 7
Let's illustrate the problem from the
oral argument in the McGuigan case.
Justice Puglia, visibly irritated that the
Psychology Board is being bothered,
notes that the statement of issues and
hearing requirement can be a problem
for the agency. What if the Board decides that the New York examination is
flawed and cannot be relied upon for
licensure? "Would the Board have to
rehear the case again and again as other
New York applicants object?" The last
phrase was stated with incredulity. Of
course, the Board may avail itself of
collateral estoppel, or adopt a rule for
examination reciprocity that New York
does not meet and cite it as justification.
Why would an applicant waste time and
money relitigating a decided question
before the very same forum which had
just decided it in any event? And, of
course, such a problem has never occurred in any serious dimension. But the
point is, who was the court identifying
with? Where was the empathy? Whose
shoes are being stepped in? It is fine to
step in the agency's shoes, so long as the
shoes of the citizen are also occupied.

The court might consider the alternative hypothetical to its own: Let's say
the New York examination is exactly
the same as the California examination
and scored the same, except the order of
questions is different. But California
officials examine the first ten questions
and erroneously assume it is a different
exam. Under the scenario implicit in the
court's approach, nobody would ever
know that the tests are identical and the
applicant should be granted licensure
without examination. The applicant
would simply be told no. No explanation, no hearing. With a statement of
issues, the applicant is told, "Your exam
is different and here is how." And the
applicant would have the chance to say,
"Whoa, it is the same, look at this." And
there would be a resolution at least based
on notice and hearing. The truth would
more likely emerge-as is always the
case where the alternative is uninformed
or unilateral edict.
Why should we have to point out the
advantages of notice and hearing? Why
should we have to make such an argument to a sitting judge? Why should we
have to convince him that notice and
hearing are of benefit to all concerned,
even an agency with an unconstitutionally restrictive or unlawful policy? Even
it has an interest in seeing that its decisions are applied based on an accurate
understanding of the facts. That is what
the court system is all about. That a
court does not appreciate such basics is
not a reflection of lack of experience; it
is based on-and Dr. McGuigan could
likely explain it better than we-psychological identification with one of the
parties. Regrettably, the party identified with is the one the court must check
in the broader public interest, undermining that duty.
The psychological empathy of a
decision maker is not always determinative, but there seems to be no more
reliable predictor of outcome. The powers of rationalization do not decline with
the enhanced intelligence of many of
our jurists. Rather, they may even increase by allowing a rich patina of facially reasonable justification to dress
up a preordained result. Pick the right
abstract value, attach the group to whom
the jurist is sympathetic to it, and observe the result. The Board of Psychology is itself a product of such a dynamic-consisting in majority as it does
of practicing psychologists. But group
identification between agencies and the
courts is also strong. Both courts and
agencies see themselves as government
officials having to contend with calendars and supplicants and the legislature.
Both courts and agencies get tired of
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people litigating or otherwise requiring
their services who really should go away.
Both courts and agencies understand
the problem of the complainer who
presses his or her claim. Both must be
able to say no. Both respect the other's
discretion in doing so.

Conclusion
In the McGuigan case, the trial court
accepted the word of the agency that it
would give a hearing to Frank McGuigan
(after the agency had stalled for six
years), and dismissed the matter as moot
solely on its belated word. The administrative law judge then accepted the extraordinary qualifications of the applicant and the clear legislative intent to
allow licensure of qualified out-of- state
applicants, but deferred to the agency's
preference nevertheless. The Court of
Appeal allowed the agency to assess the
applicant attorneys' fees as the price of
obtaining rights assured constitutionally,
by statute, and by the rules of the Board
itself, and projected hostility to the applicant and deference to the agency,
now perfectly free by court commendation to repeat the same abuse.
The
courts
are
becoming
horizontalized and psychologically integrated with the agencies they must
check. This decision 1s not an aberration, dear reader; there are many, and
their number is on the rise. This is not
what Madison and Jefferson had in mind
in their brilliant formulation of a system
of checks and balances. Would but they
were here to help restore them.

FOOTNOTES
I. Section 11504 of the Government
Code establishes the remedies of an applicant who has been denied a license or
related privilege. "A hearing to determine whether a right, authority, license
or privilege should be granted, issued
or renewed shall be initiated by filing a
statement of issues. The statement of
issues shall be a written statement specifying the statutes and rules with which
the respondent must show compliance
by producing proof at the hearing .... "
2. The Board of Psychology is undeniably subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act, under Government Code
section 1150 I.
3. Section 1381.2 of the Board's
regulations in Chapter 13.1, Title 16 of
the California Code of Regulations, provides: "An applicant for examination or
licensure whose credentials indicate ineligibility shall be notified of the deficiency. The applicant may correct the
deficiency indicated or in the alterna-
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COMMENTARY
tive file a request for hearing before the
appropriate committee."
4. Roev. Wade,4l0U.S.113(1973);
American Civil liberties Union v. Board
of Education, 55 Cal. 2d 167, 181-82
(1961); Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. v.
Workers Compensation Appeals Board,
226 Cal. App. 3d 1288 (1991 ); In Re
Lois M., 214 Cal. App. 3d I 036 (1990);
Jasperson v. Jessica's Nail Clinic, 216
Cal. App. 3d I 099 (1989); North Bay
Regional Center v. Sherry S., 207 Cal.
App. 3d (1989); Stroh v. Midway Restaurant Systems, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 3d
I040 ( 1986); Butler v. County of Los
Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 3d 633 (1981 );
Barton v. Governing Board, 60 Cal.
App. 3d 476 (1976); Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745,
749 (1956); Rattray v. Scudder, 67 Cal.
App. 2d 123, 127 (1944).
5. "In any subsequent proceeding,
the board will either grant the relief
sought, as here, or it will continue to
deny the relief, in which case the matter
will not become moot. Thus, no future
litigant will be denied relief without a
determination of whether the board is
obligated to provide a statement of issues and a hearing." McGuigan v. California Board of Psychology, No.
C0I0084 (3d Dist. Ct. App., Nov. 26,
1991) (unpublished opinion).
6. It has become chic for courts to
depublish opinions, not out of fear that
the appellate reporters are becoming too
voluminous, but rather to ensure that
review by the Supreme Court and reversal of a dubious opinion will not
occur.
7. As one stands in court before Presiding Justice Puglia, one is in the midst
of a rather dizzying collection of
subtribes. Justice Pugha·s son serves as
the public relations director at the Office of the Attorney General, counsel
for the Board appearing before him.
The father of the Attorney General
serves on the Board of Psychology's
parent agency. the Medical Board of
California. The brother of the Attorney
General is about to leave the Department of Consumer Affairs, the umbrella
agency over the Board. This is not to
imply that this or any court made a
decision because friends or relatives are
in the neighborhood of the case. The
problem is far more general and serious
than that. The associations are cited to
illustrate the interconnections which facilitate psychological identificationempathy lines. The court--designed to
check the agency--does not see itself
as a check, but as a colleague. It is still
easy for a court to check a blue-collar
cop, but when confronted with another
public official, one with a partial
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adjudicatory role, with the same problems it has, what then? With whom
does it identify?
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